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Abstract. We propose a fibre-based quantum key distribution system, which
employs polarization qubits encoded into faint laser pulses. As a novel feature,
it allows sending of classical framing information via sequences of strong laser
pulses that precede the quantum data. This allows synchronization, sender and
receiver identification, and compensation of time-varying birefringence in the
communication channel. In addition, this method also provides a platform to
communicate implementation specific information such as encoding and protocol
in view of future optical quantum networks. We demonstrate in a long-
term (37 hour) proof-of-principle study that polarization information encoded
in the classical control frames can indeed be used to stabilize unwanted qubit
transformation in the quantum channel. All optical elements in our setup can be
operated at Gbps rates, which is a first requirement for a future system delivering
secret keys at Mbps. In order to remove another bottleneck towards a high rate
system, we investigate forward error correction based on Low-Density Parity-
Check Codes.
Proof-of-Concept of Real-World Quantum Key Distribution with Quantum Frames 2
1. Introduction
Based on the particular properties of single quantum systems, quantum key
distribution (QKD) promises cryptographic key exchange over an untrusted,
authenticated public communication channel with information theoretic security
[1, 2]. Significant academic [3, 4], and industrial effort [5] has been devoted to
the development of point-to-point (P2P) QKD systems based on attenuated laser
pulses or entangled photons, and the first fully functional prototype of a quantum
cryptographic network consisting of pre-established P2P links in a trusted node
scenario has recently been demonstrated [6] (see also [7]). Furthermore, various proof-
of-principle demonstrations of quantum teleportation and quantum memory (see [8, 9]
and references therein) have been reported, which will eventually allow building of fully
quantum enabled networks [10, 11], e.g. for perfectly secure communication in settings
with un-trusted nodes and over large distances [12, 13].
Despite these remarkable achievements, the building of a reconfigurable real-
world QKD network still requires significant progress, even when limiting quantum
communication to qubits encoded into faint laser pulses and to entangled qubits.
Among the issues to be solved is the necessity to route quantum data from any
sender to any receiver. The possibility to use active optical switches to send quantum
information to different users has first been demonstrated in 2003 [14]. However,
the question regarding the addition of sender and receiver addresses to the quantum
data (which is not required in pre-established P2P links) has, to the best of our
knowledge, never been addressed. Beyond routing, another requirement for quantum
networks is path stabilization between sender and receiver, i.e. to ensure that carriers
of qubits prepared at Alice’s arrive unperturbed at Bob’s. This includes control
of the properties of the quantum channel, e.g. birefringence in an optical fibre,
and the establishment of a common reference frame at Alice’s and Bob’s, e.g. a
direction or a precise time-difference, depending on the property chosen to encode
the qubit [15]. Current P2P QKD systems are either of the ’plug & play’ type and
automatically stabilize the quantum channel [16, 17], or achieve unperturbed quantum
communication by adding from time to time short sequences of classical control
information [18]. However, neither method allows communication of the properties
that are important in reconfigurable networks, including sender and receiver address,
or the specific QKD protocol or type of qubit encoding chosen‡.
In this article we propose the use of quantum frames as a flexible framework for
sensing, communicating and controlling the parameters relevant in a QKD network
setting. Our approach is sufficiently flexible to accommodate for current and future
quantum technology or applications, including technology from different vendors,
which is important in view of open quantum networks. We demonstrate the suitability
of our solution for quantum key distribution with polarization qubits over a 12 km
real-world fibre optic link.
This article is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the general idea of
quantum frames. We then discuss the principle QKD setup (section 3), and give
further details of key components (section 4). After presenting the properties of our
fibre optics link (section 5), we describe the QKD field tests and discuss the results
‡ Note that this information can also be sent through another (classical) channel. However, given that
control information for channel stabilization has to be sent in any case (except for auto-compensating
systems such as the ’plug & play’ system), it is natural to consider sending the network relevant control
information through the quantum channel as well.
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Figure 1. Quantum framing with alternating classical control frames (C-
frames, inspired by the Ethernet protocol) and quantum data. In the here
reported implementation, subsequent C-frames encode different polarization
states (horizontal, vertical and circular), each one used to independently stabilize
one particular set of polarization qubit basis states.
(section 6), and then elaborate briefly on some issues related to the security of the
key establishment (section 7). In section 8 we present the status of our classical
post processing, required to distill a secret key, specifically the possibility of hardware
implementation of one-way error correction. We present our conclusions in section 9.
2. Quantum Frames
To add control functionalities to the communication between Alice and Bob, we
propose supplementing the quantum data (e.g. qubits) with classical control frames.
The control frames (C-frame), encoded into strong laser pulses, alternate with the
quantum data, and a pair of classical/quantum data forms a quantum frame (Q-
frame), see figure 1. The C-frame allows synchronizing sender Alice and receiver Bob,
facilitates time-tagging, and provides a platform to communicate sender and receiver
address (for routing or packet switching) plus implementation specific information
such as encoding (e.g. polarization or time-bin qubit [15]) and protocol (e.g. BB84 [1],
decoy state [19, 20, 21], or B92 [22]). This is interesting in view of open, reconfigurable
networks comprising different QKD technologies.
The classical information in our implementation is encoded into specific polariza-
tion states, allowing assessment and compensation of time-varying birefringence in the
quantum channel. Note that the compensation scheme can easily be adapted to other
QKD setups employing e.g. time-bin qubits, entanglement, or quantum repeaters.
Furthermore, the C-frames can be used to asses channel loss, which may be important
for routing.
3. Our QKD System
Our QKD system is based on polarization qubits, and employs the BB84 protocol [1],
supplemented with two decoy states [19, 20, 21]. It allows alternating sequences of
strong and faint laser pulses, encoding classical data and quantum data, respectively.
A simplified schematic of the QKD system is depicted in figure 2. Alice uses two
laser diodes to generate the classical data (LDC) and the quantum data (LDQ). The
pulses emitted from LDQ are first attenuated by an optical attenuator (ATT), and
then sent through an intensity modulator (IM) to create signal and decoy states with
different mean photon numbers. To create vacuum decoy states, no electrical pulses
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Figure 2. Schematic of our QKD system.
are sent to LDQ. The horizontally polarized faint pulses are then transmitted through
a polarization beam splitter (PBS), and combined with the strong, vertically polarized
pulses from LDC. All pulses are then sent to a polarization modulator (PM), where
horizontal (H), vertical (V), right (R), or left (L) circular polarization states can be
created.
Quantum and classical data is transmitted to Bob through a quantum channel. At
Bob’s end, 10% of the light is directed towards a fast photo detector (PD) followed by
a logic device (LOG). The detector and the logic device, which were not implemented
in our investigation, will read the information encoded in the classical data and take
appropriate action, e.g. for clock synchronization, optical routing, or communication
of protocol specific information used by Bob for the measurement and subsequent
processing of the quantum data.
The remaining light is split at a 50/50 beam splitter (BS), and directed
to two polarization stabilizers (PS1, PS2) followed by polarization beam splitters
(PBS1, PBS2) and single photon detectors (SPDs). PS1 ensures that horizontally
polarized classical data, and hence qubits, emitted at Alice’s arrive unchanged at
PBS1. Similarly, PS2 is set up such that right circular polarized classical data and
qubits emitted at Alice’s always impinge horizontally polarized on PBS2. Since
the transformation in the quantum channel is described by a unitary matrix (i.e.
orthogonal states remain orthogonal), our stabilization scheme ensures that qubits
prepared in H and V, or R and L states arrive horizontally and vertically polarized on
PBS1 or PBS2, respectively. Hence, the two sets of PS, PBS and two SPDs both allow
compensation of unwanted polarization transformations in the quantum channel, and
projection measurements onto H, V, R and L, as required in the BB84 protocol. Note
that our scheme does not prevent H and V created at Alice’s from arriving in an
arbitrary superposition of H and V at PBS2 (similar for R and L at PBS1). However,
these cases do not cause errors as they are eliminated during key sifting.
4. Polarization and Intensity Modulators
4.1. One-Way Polarization and Intensity Modulator
Initially, we used a commercial LiNbO3 phase modulator (PM) and a Mach-Zehnder
intensity modulator in a one-way configuration to achieve fast polarization and
intensity modulation. Figure 3(a) shows the schematics of the polarization modulator,
i.e. a phase modulator with polarization maintaining input fibre (PMF) whose slow
axis is rotated 45 degrees (R45) with respect to the optical axis of the modulator
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Figure 3. Schematics of (a) one-way polarization modulator, (b) basic unit,
(c) two-way polarization modulator based on basic unit, (d) two-way intensity
modulator based on basic unit.
waveguide, and standard single mode output fibre (SMF). Hence, horizontally
polarized input light, which propagates parallel to the slow axis of the PMF, is split
into two components, where each one propagates along one axis of the waveguide. By
applying a control voltage to the phase modulator, a phase shift is introduced between
the two components, resulting in a polarization modulation.
Unfortunately, the phase modulator features significant polarization mode
dispersion (PMD) for 500 ps long optical pulses resulting in a polarization extinction
ratio (PER), i.e. the ratio between optical power in two orthogonal polarization states,
of only 16 dB. Moreover, we found both the phase and intensity modulator to be
temperature sensitive – a change of environmental temperature or heating caused by
passing a current through the impedance matching resistance inside the modulators
causes a variation of the polarization state, or the intensity level, of the output light.
This would have a direct impact on the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and stability
of our QKD system.
4.2. The “Basic Unit”
To overcome these problems, we designed a “basic unit” (see figure 3(b)) consisting
of a phase modulator (PM) with 45 degree rotated input PMF and a Faraday mirror
(FM) [23]. As explained below, this allows building stable polarization and intensity
modulators by means of a go-and-return configuration (the light travels twice and in
orthogonal polarization states through the phase modulator).
To explain how the basic unit works, we calculate the polarization evolution of
light using Jones calculus:
Jout =MBU · Jin. (1)
Jin and Jout denote the Jones polarization vectors of the input and output light,
respectively, and MBU is the polarization transformation matrix of the basic unit:
MBU =
←−
MPMF · R†45 ·
←−
MWG · ←−MSMF · FM
· −→MSMF · −→MWG ·R45 · −→MPMF.
(2)
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MSMF,MPMF, andMWG denote the polarization transformation matrices of the single
mode fibre, the polarization maintaining fibre and the waveguide, respectively, and
the arrows on top of the matrices specify the direction of light propagation. FM
denotes the effect of the Faraday mirror, and R45 characterizes the rotation between
the polarization maintaining fibre and the waveguide. Assuming that one can neglect
all temperature or mechanical stress mediated changes of the properties of the fibres
and the waveguide between two subsequent passages of a pulse of light (around
ten nanoseconds in our setup), and that these elements do not feature polarization
dependent loss, we have
←−
MPMF =M
†
PMF,
−→
MPMF =MPMF,
MPMF =
[
1 0
0 eiφPMF
]
,
(3)
where M † stands for the adjoint matrix of M , and φPMF is the phase shift caused by
the birefringence of the polarization maintaining fibre. Furthermore, we have
←−
MSMF =M
†
SMF,
−→
MSMF =MSMF,
MSMF =
[ √
a
√
1− aeiα√
1− aeiβ −√aei(α+β)
]
,
(4)
where MSMF is the most general unitary matrix describing polarization transforma-
tions. The matrices of the waveguide are given by
−→
MWG =
[
1 0
0 ei(φ
in
m
+φ
e
)
]
,
←−
MWG =
[
1 0
0 e−i(φ
out
m
+φ
e
)
]
, (5)
where φinm and φ
out
m denote the phase shifts during the two subsequent passages of
the light through the waveguide, as determined by the modulation voltage applied to
the waveguide, and φe refers to an additional, wavelength and polarization dependent
phase shift (leading to PMD).
The effect of the Faraday mirror is to transform the polarization state of an
arbitrary input state of light Jin with components j1, j2 into the orthogonal state [3]:
FM · Jin = FM ·
[
j1
j2
]
=
[
j∗2
−j∗1
]
≡ J⊥in. (6)
Hence, from equation (6), we obtain the identity
FM ·M · Jin = FM ·
[
A B
C D
]
· Jin
=
[
D∗ −C∗
−B∗ A∗
]
· FM · Jin
(7)
and thus
M † · FM ·M · Jin =
[
A B
C D
]†
· FM ·
[
A B
C D
]
· Jin
=
[
A∗ C∗
B∗ D∗
]
·
[
D∗ −C∗
−B∗ A∗
]
· FM · Jin
= (A∗D∗ −B∗C∗) · 1 · FM · Jin
= det(M∗) · J⊥in,
(8)
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whereM is an arbitrary two-by-two matrix, which may describe wavelength dependent
polarization rotations or polarization dependent loss, and 1 is the two-by-two identity
matrix. Equation (8) shows that any polarization transformation is compensated by
the Faraday mirror; the output polarization state Jout is always orthogonal to the
input state Jin, regardless of M .
Calculating the product of all matrices in equation (2), we obtain
MBU = e
−i(φSMF+φPMF+φe+φ
′
m
)
·
[
cos∆φm −ieiφPMF sin∆φm
−ie−iφPMF sin∆φm cos∆φm
]
· FM,
(9)
where φ
′
m =
φin
m
+φout
m
2 , ∆φm =
φout
m
−φin
m
2 , and φSMF = pi − α − β. Accordingly, for a
horizontal input state, we find
Jout =MBU ·
[
1
0
]
= e−i(φSMF+φPMF+φe+φ
′
m
) ·
[ −ieiφPMF sin∆φm
cos∆φm
]
= e−i(φSMF+φPMF+φe+φ
′
m
) ·
[
eiφPMF 0
0 1
]
·
[ −i sin∆φm
cos∆φm
]
.
(10)
Hence, owing to the use of a Faraday mirror, the polarization and wavelength
dependent phase shift φe introduced by the waveguide impacts now on the global
phase but does not lead to polarization mode dispersion any more. Furthermore, all
(slow) modifications of the polarization modulation due to changes in temperature or
mechanical stress of the SM and PM fibres are automatically compensated. The output
polarization state thus only depends on the modulation of the waveguide (∆φm) and
the phase shift induced by the polarization maintaining fibre (φPMF).
4.3. Two-Way Polarization Modulator
We complemented the basic unit to a polarization modulator by preceding it by a
polarization maintaining circulator (CIR) that allows separating the input and output
optical pulses (see figure 3(c)). By applying appropriate, short voltage pulses, which
are synchronized with the propagations of the optical pulse, to the phase modulator, we
can generate horizontal (∆φm = pi/2), vertical (∆φm = 0), right-hand (∆φm = −pi/4),
or left-hand circular polarization (∆φm = pi/4) states. We point out that the existence
of the phase introduced by the PM fibre, φPMF, makes circular polarization states
unstable. However, note that the four generated polarization states always form two
mutually unbiased bases, regardless the value of this phase, as required for secure
QKD. Furthermore, as the change in the polarization maintaining fibre is slow, it can
be compensated by a polarization stabilizer at Bob’s, allowing for the establishment
of a sifted key with a small quantum bit error rate (QBER).
We obtained a polarization extinction ratio of 20 dB for horizontal and
vertical polarization states (limited by the light source used to test the polarization
modulator), see figure 4, and of 15 dB for left and right circular polarization. We
believe the reduced ratio to be caused by state dependent polarization mode dispersion
in the circulator, which will be replaced in the near future.
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Figure 4. Test of the two-way polarization modulator. In the experiment, the
light exiting the modulator was split by a polarization beam splitter (PBS) and the
power was measured at the two outputs (H and V) as a function of the modulation
voltage. The polarization extinction ratio (PER) is defined as the ratio between
the power in the two outputs.
4.4. Two-Way Intensity Modulator
Similarly, we built an intensity modulator by preceding the basic unit by a PBS, as
shown in figure 3(d). The PBS reflects the vertical component of the impinging light.
Hence, by varying the polarization state of the light at the output of the basic unit,
we can vary the intensity of the vertical component at the output of the PBS.
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Figure 5. Tests of the two-way intensity modulator. Figure (a) shows the output
power as a function of the applied voltage pulse to the phase modulator. The
modulator features an extinction ratio of 23 dB. Figure (b) depicts the output
power as a function of time. For this measurement, the output power was set to
50% of its maximum value. The total variation in 12 hours is less than ±1.5%.
This is mostly determined by the power fluctuations of the laser diode, which we
found to be ±1.15% in 3 hours (note that the latter can be further reduced using
external power control).
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Figure 6. Satellite view of Calgary, showing the University of Calgary (U of C)
and the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology (SAIT).
The intensity extinction ratio, i.e. the ratio between the maximum and minimum
intensity at the output of the PBS, exceeds 20 dB (see figure 5(a)). Moreover, as
the phase, φPMF, does not impact on the output intensity, our modulator features an
outstanding stability, as depicted in figure 5(b). This is important when implementing
a decoy state QKD protocol, which relies on accurate preparation of average photon
numbers per faint laser pulse.
5. The Fiber Link
5.1. Loss
The link consists of two single-mode dark fibres connecting laboratories at the
University of Calgary (U of C) and the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology
(SAIT), see figure 6. The fibres, which we refer to as channel 1 and channel 2, run
through tunnels on the two campuses, and are buried or run through train tunnels
in between the two institutions. They feature insertion loss of 7.8 dB and 6.5 dB,
respectively. The fibre length is 12.4 km while the straight-line distance between the
two laboratories is 3.3 km. A 1300 nm optical time-domain reflectometer (OTDR)
with a 1 km dead zone eliminator was used to characterize the installed fibres. Figure
7 shows the measured OTDR traces. The figure clearly shows that the last several
kilometers of fibre have bad connections, which result in high transmission loss in
our system. The peaks at the distance of 1 km are induced by the core diameter
mismatch between the tested fibre and the dead zone eliminator, where the latter one
is a multi-mode fibre.
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Figure 7. OTDR traces of the installed fibres. The horizontal axis denotes the
distance measured from the laboratory at SAIT. The vertical axis denotes the
logarithm of the ratio between the back scattered power detected by the OTDR
and a reference power set by the instrument, where a higher value corresponds to
more reflected power.
5.2. Polarization Transformation
We experimentally studied the time evolution of polarization in the installed fibre.
In the experiment, a stable polarized light source was launched into the fibre link,
where channel 1 and channel 2 were looped at SAIT. We used a polarimeter to record
Stokes parameters of the output light every second. Figure 8(a) presents the results of
one-week of continuous monitoring from April 16, 2008 to April 24, 2008. Figure 8(b)
shows the temperature curve for the Calgary Airport during the measurement (data
from Canada Environment Weather Office). Comparing figure 8(a) and figure 8(b), we
observe a clear correlation between the variation of temperature and the fluctuation
of polarization. This phenomenon is particularly obvious for the measurement from
April 19 to April 23, where we observe small polarization variation during night, and
much more pronounced variations during day-time. Figure 8(c) is a zoom-in of the
measurement on April 19 (around lunch time), where particularly rapid polarization
fluctuations are observed. Even for this case, we find that the polarization is stable on
a time scale of tens of seconds. This sets an upper limit to the duration of quantum
data between consecutive stabilization cycles.
6. Field Tests
6.1. Setup
A schematic of the complete experimental setup is shown in figure 9. A 10 GS/s
function generator (FG1) with two independent outputs drives the quantum laser
diode (LDQ) and the classical laser diode (LDC) via broadband RF amplifiers (APs).
Both laser diodes produce horizontally polarized optical pulses with a duration of
500 ps and a repetition rate of 50 MHz. By adjusting the temperature, we could
closely match the spectral properties of the two laser diodes. We obtained center
wavelengths of 1548.07 nm and 1548.11 nm, and spectral widths (FWHM) of 0.214 nm
and 0.224 nm for LDQ and LDC, respectively. This is important to ensure that the
polarization transformation sensed by means of the C-frames (generated with LDC)
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Figure 8. (a)Time evolution of Stokes parameters during a full week in 2008. The
shaded regions indicate night-time from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. (b) Temperature
curve for Calgary. (c) Zoom of (a) around April 19, lunch time.
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Figure 9. Schematics of the QKD setup.
equals the one experienced by the quantum data (generated with LDQ).
The pulses from LDQ, eventually encoding quantum data at different mean
photon numbers, propagate through a two-by-two polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and
enter the intensity modulator, which is described in detail in section 4. To reduce
their energy to the single-photon level, a fixed optical attenuator (ATT) is placed
between the Faraday mirror (FM) and the phase modulator (PM). Birefringence and
polarization dependent loss of the attenuator are automatically compensated by the
Faraday effect and therefore a stable attenuation is achieved. At the output of the
PBS, the now vertically polarized weak laser pulses are combined with the horizontally
polarized strong pulses from LDC, which encode the C-frame, to form a complete Q-
frame. Quantum and classical data is then sent through the polarization modulator,
which is also presented in section 4. The intensity and the polarization modulator
are driven by a function generator (FG2) with a pulse width of 4 ns. Note that the
polarization maintaining circulator (CIR) that is part of the polarization modulator
only allows horizontally polarized light to enter, while the pulses from LDC and
LDQ impinge with orthogonal polarization. Therefore, we aligned the axes of the
polarization maintaining fibre at the output of the PBS at 45 degrees with respect
to the axes of the polarization maintaining fibre at the input of the circulator. This
alignment makes the circulator work with both directions of polarization, yet, at the
expense of 3 dB loss. Finally, the polarization modulated data is forwarded to Bob
through fibre channel 2.
Alice’s electronic equipment is synchronized using a clock signal at 10 MHz
from a clock generator (CG). Using a function generator, a laser diode (LDS), a
photodiode (PD), and a delay generator (DG), the clock signal (reduced to 1 MHz)
is also transmitted to Bob, where it provides trigger signals for the single photon
detectors, synchronized with the arrival time of the quantum data.
At Bob’s side, 90% of the optical power encoded into each Q-frame is transmitted
through a 10/90 beam splitter and is then equally divided by a 50/50 beam splitter.
For each part, the C-frames are sensed by a polarization stabilizer (PS, from General
Photonics) to compensate for the polarization change in the transmission line, and
the quantum data is detected by a measurement module consisting of a PBS and two
InGaAs based single photon detectors (SPDs). The SPDs are triggered at 1 MHz, and
operated with a gate width of 5 ns, a deadtime of 10 µs and a quantum efficiency of
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10%.
In principle, the length of a C-frame is determined by the response time of the
polarization stabilizer, which is 18 ms. However, due to the small duty cycle of the
classical pulse sequence in the current implementation and the low transmission of the
fibre link, the average power of the C-frame is below the detection threshold of the
polarization stabilizer. To resolve this problem, we placed a polarization maintaining
erbium doped fibre amplifier (EDFA) between LDC and the PBS. The EDFA is turned
off after each C-frame to avoid flooding the SPDs at Bob’s with photons from amplified
spontaneous emission. While the turn-off time is only tens of milliseconds (consistent
with the radiative lifetime of population in the upper laser level), we found the turn-on
time of the EDFA to be as long as 3 seconds, resulting in 5-second long C-frames. The
length of quantum data is set to 2 seconds, according to the “worst-case” polarization
stability of the fibre link, which is discussed in section 5. From this, we find that our
setup currently limits the time for quantum key distribution to 30% of the operation
time. Note, however, that the duty cycle of the classical pulse sequence can easily
be increased by several orders of magnitude. In this case the duration of a C-frame
would be limited by the response time of the polarization stabilizer, and the time for
QKD could exceed 99% of the system’s operation time.
6.2. Measurements
We performed a variety of measurements to assess the performance of our QKD system.
For 2-detector measurements, Alice repetitively creates sequences of Q-frames with
polarizations HH, HL, HV, HR, LH, LL, LV, LR, VH, VL, VV, VR, RH, RL, RV,
and RR. The first letter indicates the polarization of the C-frame and the second one
indicates that of the quantum data. Bob uses one measurement module to process
the frames. The polarization stabilizer compensates the polarization transformation
in the quantum channel for states belonging to the basis indicated by the first letter,
i.e. linear or circular. For 4-detector measurements, Alice modulates the polarization
of the Q-frames in the more complicated order of HH, RH, VH, LH, RH, HH, LH,
VH, HR, RR, VR, LR, RR, HR, LR, VR, HV, RV, VV, LV, RV, HV, LV, VV, HL,
RL, VL, LL, RL, HL, LL, VL. Bob uses two measurement modules to process the
Q-frames. The polarization stabilizer of one module is always activated for odd frame
numbers, and that of the other module is always activated for even frame numbers
(see figure 1). In this way, the two measurement modules compensate polarization
transformation for states encoded in the linear, or the circular basis, respectively. We
collect the number of trigger events and counts for all single photon detectors for each
combination of polarization states and different mean number of photons per qubit.
This allows calculating average quantum bit error rates (QBER) and key generation
probabilities (KGP), where the KGP is defined as the probability of generating a sifted
key bit from a qubit encoded into a weak signal state when Alice and Bob use the
same basis:
QBER =
Pwrong
Pwrong + Pcorrect
,
KGP = Pcorrect + Pwrong.
(11)
The probabilities for correct (Pcorrect) and wrong sifted key bits (Pwrong) are obtained
from experimental data by dividing the number of correct, or wrong, detection events
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by the number of trigger events. We assume that the probability for both detectors
to click simultaneously can be ignored. In our setup, it was at least four orders of
magnitude smaller compared to the probability for a single click. Note that in an actual
implementation simultaneous clicks in two or more detectors have to be replaced by
a randomly selected detection event [24, 25].
Assuming that the photon number per laser pulse satisfies a Poissonian
distribution, Pcorrect and Pwrong can be calculated using
Pcorrect = 1−
∞∑
n=0
µne−µ
n!
(1− Y0
2
)(1 − tηa)n
= 1− (1− Y0
2
)e−µtηa
Pwrong = 1−
∞∑
n=0
µne−µ
n!
(1− Y0
2
)
(
1− tη(1− a))n
= 1− (1− Y0
2
)e−µtη(1−a).
(12)
Y0/2 is the probability for a detector click without Alice sending a photon, which
includes detection events due to dark counts and stray photons. We found this
probability in our setup to be equivalent to the dark count rate. µ is the average
photon number of the weak pulses at Alice’s output, t is the overall transmission, which
includes the fibre link and Bob’s optical components, and η is the quantum efficiency
of the single photon detectors. Finally, a describes the polarization extinction ratio
of the PBS, i.e. the probability for a horizontally polarized photon to be transmitted
through the PBS, normalized to the probability to exit.
The experimental results of the measurements are summarized in figure 10,
together with the theoretical predictions. Note that all parameters required
to calculate the QBER and the KGP have been obtained through independent
measurements. We see that the experimental values match the theoretical calculations
very well. We also find that the average QBER of the 4-detector measurement is larger
than that of the 2-detector measurement at the same mean photon number. This is
due to an increased dark count probability of the two additional SPDs, and slightly
worse alignment of the polarization stabilizer in the second measurement module.
Furthermore, the 4-detector measurement features a higher KGP as no qubits are lost
at the 50/50 beam splitter. The individual data of the 4-detector measurement with
an average photon number of 0.5 photons per pulse is listed in table 1.
6.3. Long-Term Stability of the System
To study the stability of the system, we performed a long time measurement over 37
hours. In the measurement, Alice sends qubits encoded into weak laser pulses with
an average photon number of 0.5, and Bob implements a 2-detector measurement
using measurement module one. At the end of each C-frame, i.e. after stabilization,
Bob records the polarization of the C-frame with PS1. Meanwhile, the polarization
stabilizer (PS2) in the second measurement module monitors the polarization of the C-
frame without polarization control. In figure 11(a), the red points indicate the Stokes
vectors of the classical pulses measured by PS2, which are randomly distributed on
the surface of the Poincare´ sphere due to the time-varying polarization transformation
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Figure 10. Average QBER and KGP (in dB) as a function of the mean
photon number per weak laser pulse used to encode the polarization qubits.
The squares and circles indicate the experimental results for the 2-detector and
4-detector measurements, respectively, and the solid and dashed lines are the
corresponding theoretical predictions (no fit). Error bars (corresponding to one
standard deviation) are smaller than the size of each experimental data point.
Table 1. Results of the 4-detector measurement with an average photon number
of 0.5 photons per pulse, where pol indicates the polarizations of the Q-frames,
det and trg are the number of photon detections and trigger events recorded by
the single photon detectors, and prob is the detection probability (in dB).
SPD1 SPD2
pol det trg prob (dB) det trg prob (dB)
HH 1,569 13,254,716 −39.27 37,639 12,504,218 −25.21
HV 39,642 13,381,789 −25.28 1,922 13,385,381 −38.43
RR 1,243 13,160,359 −40.25 35,711 12,443,131 −25.42
RL 41,856 13,521,618 −25.09 1,979 13,505,244 −38.34
VH 42,567 12,853,157 −24.80 950 12,863,193 −41.32
VV 1,569 13,183,509 −39.24 34,723 12,454,406 −25.55
LL 41,800 13,514,989 −25.10 1,841 13,114,840 −38.53
LR 959 10,908,918 −40.56 30,270 10,273,810 −25.31
SPD3 SPD4
pol det trg prob (dB) det trg prob (dB)
HH 37,577 12,468,543 −25.21 1,050 12,416,198 −40.73
HV 2,121 12,145,604 −37.58 35,843 11,410,147 −25.03
RR 35,954 12,409,015 −25.38 1,605 12,351,662 −38.86
RL 3,222 12,253,689 −35.80 36,378 11,541,004 −25.01
VH 2,410 12,817,201 −37.26 39,290 12,046,285 −24.86
VV 36,215 12,403,829 −25.35 925 12,355,805 −41.26
LL 2,751 12,270,811 −36.49 36,547 11,534,262 −24.99
LR 29,988 10,247,919 −25.34 1,149 10,193,024 −39.48
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Figure 11. Results of the long-term measurement. (a) Stokes vectors of C-
frames with (blue points) and without (red points) polarization stabilization. (b)
Average QBER and temperature for the same time interval as a function of time.
in the transmission line. The blue points depict the measurements made by PS1, i.e.
after polarization control. Even though the result slightly deviates from a single spot,
which is expected in the ideal case, it clearly demonstrates the good long-term stability
of our QKD system.
For a more quantitative analysis, we also recorded the evolution of the QBER
over the same time interval, see figure 11(b). The temperature curve for the Calgary
Airport (data from Canada Environment Weather Office) is shown as well. The QBER
varies between 2.85% and 3.35% in over 35 hours, and the variation is less than 0.1%
in the last 15 hours.
7. Security Issues
For any cryptographic system, be it of quantum or classical nature, it is important to
carefully analyze the actual implementation for weak points that may compromise its
principle security. Applied to quantum key distribution, these include deficiencies in
the preparation of quantum data at Alice’s that can be exploited by an eavesdropper
to gain information about the sifted key. We refer to these kind of attacks as quantum
state attacks. Furthermore, Eve may also attempt to actively sense the classical devices
that create or measure the quantum data, or try to actively impact on the interaction
between quantum and classical systems to influence the outcomes of measurements.
We refer to these kind of attacks as classical system attacks.
Note that, once the deficiencies are found, it may be possible to eliminate them by
devising a better optical setup, or to remove the corresponding amount of information
that Eve may have obtained through additional privacy amplification [26]. Yet, we
point out that loopholes may also arise from a careless implementation of privacy
amplification, e.g. improper choice of Hash function, or of insufficient authentication
of the classical channel. Finally, the size of the error corrected key has to be considered
when calculating the appropriate amount of privacy amplification, i.e. to distil a secure
key [27, 28].
In the following, we will briefly discuss our current optical setup in view of such
weak points. Yet, a complete security analysis of our system is beyond the scope of
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this article, which is the introduction of quantum frames. Note that the existence
of loopholes in a particular QKD setup breaks the unconditional security of this
particular system, but does not disprove that QKD can, in principle, be information
theoretic secure.
7.1. Quantum State Attacks
The use of attenuated laser pulses, as opposed to pairs of entangled photons [3], entails
the possibility that non-orthogonal qubit states (here encoded into the polarization
degrees of freedom) may become distinguishable when taking into account other
degrees of freedom needed to fully describe the quantum data, e.g. frequency, temporal
modes, or transverse modes. Obviously, in this case, the security offered by QKD
would break down. We refer to these attacks as quantum side channel attacks.
Furthermore, as the number of photons in the attenuated laser pulses is described by
a Poissonian distribution, it may be possible for an eavesdropper to gain information
based on photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks.
Attacks Exploiting Quantum Side Channels: In our QKD system, all four qubit
states are produced by the same laser diode, which is triggered independently of
the subsequent action of the polarization or intensity modulators. Together with
the polarization independent spectral transmission of both modulators and the
attenuator, due to the use of the Faraday mirrors, this ensures that correlation between
polarization state and spectrum or temporal mode do not exist. However, we recall
that the circulator (CIR) at the output of the polarization modulator adds basis
dependent polarization mode dispersion, which manifests as a basis dependent QBER.
This may induce detectable temporal broadening of the photonic wavepackets, i.e. may
partially reveal the basis used for encoding the qubit. The circulator will be replaced
in a future, improved setup.
Furthermore, as the entire setup is built with (transverse) single mode optical
fibres, correlation between polarization states and transverse modes, which may be
present in a free space system, are ruled out.
PNS Attacks and Decoy States: The use of faint laser pulses makes our system
principally susceptible to photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks, which were first
mentioned in [29] and have been analyzed thoroughly in [30, 31]. A possibility to
remove the threat of the PNS attack is the use of so-called decoy states [19, 20, 21].
This allows establishing a conservative lower bound for the key that can be created
from single photons emitted at Alice’s, i.e. key that was not subject to the PNS attack.
As described before, our setup has been devised to allow for the implementation of
decoy states. In the following we will examine experimentally the accuracy with which
the decoy state method allows bounding the size of the secret key.
With the GLLP method the secure key rate per emitted faint pulse with mean
photon number of µ is given by [32]
S ≥ 1
2
[
Q1(1 −H2(E1))−Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ)
]
(13)
where the factor 1/2 accounts for basis reconciliation, H2(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1 −
x)log2(1− x) denotes the Shannon entropy, Q1, Qµ, E1 and Eµ specify the gains and
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error rates of signal states and single photons, respectively, and f(Eµ) is the error
correction efficiency which is assumed to be 1.22 [33].
In the first analysis, we assume that no PNS attack took place during the
measurement, which is a reasonable assumption. Using equations (12), we can estimate
the gain and error rate for signal states with mean photon number µ:
Qµ = Pcorrect(µ) + Pwrong(µ)
= 2− (1− Y0/2)(e−µtηa + e−µtη(1−a))
Eµ =
Pwrong(µ)
Pcorrect(µ) + Pwrong(µ)
=
1− (1 − Y0/2)e−µtηa
2− (1− Y0/2)(e−µtηa + e−µtη(1−a))
.
(14)
Similarly, the gain and error rate for single photon pulses are given by
Q1 = µe
−µ
(
2− (1− Y0/2)(2 − tη))
E1 =
1− (1− Y0/2)(1− (1− a)tη)
2− (1− Y0/2)(2− tη) .
(15)
Using equation (13), (14) and (15) and taking into account the measured values for
t, η, a and Y0/2, we can calculate the secret key rate for different µ, see curve A of
figure 12.
In the second analysis, which again relies on the assumption of fair loss, we use
equation (14) to calculate the gains and error rates for the signal state with mean
photon number µ and the decoy state with mean photon number ν of 0.1. To calculate
the gain and error rate for single photon pulses, we use equations (34), (35) and (37)
from [20]:
Q1 ≥ Qν,01 =
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
e1 ≤ eν,01 =
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Y L,ν,01 ν
Y1 ≥ Y L,ν,01 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
Y0
)
.
(16)
The resulting secret key rate follows from equation (13). It is shown in curve B of
figure 12.
Finally, we calculate the secret key rate using the experimentally measured gain
and error rates for signal and decoy states, as opposed to the previous case where they
were calculated. The gain and error rate for single photons are estimated as before
using equations (16). The result is plotted in curve C of figure 12. Note that the
measurement does not rely on the fair loss assumption.
Comparing the three different curves, we find that the rates estimated from the
decoy state method (curves B and C) is somewhat smaller than the one plotted in
curve A. This is natural as the decoy state method with decoy states of finite photon
mean number only yields a conservative lower bound [20]. As an example, for µ = 0.6,
we find the secret key rate (curve B and C) to be roughly 10% worse than the secret
key rate given in curve A. We also find a reasonably good agreement between the rates
estimated and measured using the decoy state method (curves B and C, respectively).
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Figure 12. Comparison of secret key rates versus mean number of photons in
the signal states. Curve A is the secret key rate calculated from the fraction of
single photons emitted at Alice’s and assuming fair loss (i.e. assuming it is known
that all loss is of technological origin and that there is no PNS attack). Curve
B shows the secret key rate calculated via the decoy state method (using decoy
states with mean photon number of 0.1 and vacuum states) and assuming fair
loss. Curve C is the secret key rate obtained via the decoy state method using
experimental data. All calculations assume an infinite sifted key length.
We attribute the remaining discrepancy to a systematic error in the estimation of the
single photon gain Q1, resulting from a slightly wrong estimation of the transmission
in the link, quantum efficiency of the detectors, or error rate due to wrongly received
photons. Factors like fluctuations in the mean photon number could also have an
effect. This systematic error also affects the estimation of the single photon error
rate E1. Furthermore, curve B and C show that the secret key rate in our QKD
system is maximized for signal states with a mean number of photons of µ ≈ 0.6. This
value agrees with estimations in [20] when taking into account the actual values for
dark count rates, transmission, detector quantum efficiency, and error rate caused by
wrongly received photons. Indeed, we calculate µopt = 0.62, in very good agreement
with our experimental results.
To finish this discussion, we emphasize that the secret key rate in an actual
implementation of an information-theoretic secure QKD session must be calculated
using the decoy state method used in the third analysis and must not rely on
assumptions about fair loss in the quantum channel.
Other deficiencies: We have noted that each faint pulse that encodes a qubit is
preceded by another faint pulse, originating from a reflection on the PBS that is
part of the intensity modulator (see section 4). Note that the number of photons
in both pulses is comparable. Obviously, for our assessment of the eavesdropper’s
information to be correct, we have to make sure that this pulse, which also transits
through the polarization modulator, does not encode any polarization information.
Therefore, we have carefully adjusted the electrical trigger signal for the polarization
modulator such that it only acts on the “real” faint pulse, and not on the spurious
one.
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7.2. Classical System Attacks
Trojan Horse Attacks: As in any QKD system, regardless whether it employs one-way
or two-way quantum communication, appropriate measures have to be implemented to
protect against Trojan-Horse attacks [34]. In these attacks, the eavesdropper injects
light through the optical fibre into Alice’s or Bob’s preparation or measurement device,
respectively, and analyzes the back reflection, which may reveal information about
the quantum state created at Alice’s or the measurement basis to be used at Bob’s.
In both cases, the security of the key distribution would be compromised as Eve
either knows the state, or knows in which basis to perform an intercept resend attack
without creating errors. In our QKD system, given the static setup at Bob’s, Trojan
Horse attacks have to be considered only at Alice’s. Towards this end, a polarization
independent optical isolator and a spectral filter that absorbs all wavelengths not
blocked by the isolator should be placed at the output of Alice’s.
Time-shift attacks: In a time-shift attack [35, 36, 37] the eavesdropper exploits the
fact that the detection efficiency of different detectors may, for a given arrival time of a
photon, be different. It may thus be possible for an eavesdropper to bias the detection
probabilities by actively time-shifting the arrival time of photons and thereby acquire
information for each photon if it was detected in a detector that codes for a bit value
0, or 1. This attack, which is possible in our current system, can be overcome if Bob
randomly rotates the polarization state of each incoming qubit by 0 or pi/2, thereby de-
correlating a detection in a particular detector with a particular bit value. This can be
done by placing a rapidly variable λ/2 waveplate in between the polarization stabilizer
and the PBSs, at the expense of rendering Bob’s setup “active”, i.e. vulnerable to
Trojan Horse attacks (which then have to be protected against, as discussed above).
8. Classical Post-Processing
Once the quantum part of the QKD protocol is finished, Alice and Bob must perform
a series of classical steps to go from the raw key to the secret key used for encryption
[3]. The steps required are shown in figure 13. In addition to sifting, error correction
is used to ensure that Alice and Bob have an identical key despite any errors that
occur. Privacy amplification is then used to eliminate any information Eve has
obtained about the key, whether through eavesdropping on the quantum channel
or on the classical communication used for error correction. These steps must also
make use of authenticated communication to prevent Eve from performing a man-
in-the-middle attack. Of these steps, error correction is expected to become the
bottleneck in the QKD system once higher raw key rates are achieved. The Cascade
protocol [38] that was originally developed for QKD is not suitable for high key
rates as it requires many rounds of communication between Alice and Bob and is
computationally expensive [39].
8.1. Low-Density Parity-Check Codes
Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes were originally developed by Gallager in the
1960s [40] for classical communications, but their potential performance has only been
recently been discovered [41]. LDPC codes for QKD differ slightly from those used
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Figure 13. Classical post-processing steps.
in the classical case as the parity information is transmitted over a separate classical
channel [39].
A LDPC code is defined using anm×n parity check matrix, H , consisting of zeros
and ones. While either Alice’s or Bob’s sifted key may be considered the “correct”
key for the purpose of error correction, this discussion will use Alice’s sifted key, the n
bit column vector α, i.e. one-way, forward error correction. Alice computes a parity
vector as follows:
p = Hα (mod 2), (17)
where the number of bits m in the parity vector is lower bounded by Shannon’s noisy
coding theorem; m = nH2(QBER) with Shannon Entropy H2. Thus, pi indicates
whether the sifted key bits indicated by the ones in the ith row of H contain an even
(pi=0) or odd (pi=1) number of ones. Alice transmits p to Bob, whose task it is to
determine α using H , p, his sifted key, β, and an initial estimate of the QBER. This
estimate can be based on a characterization of the quantum channel or on the QBER
from previous executions of the protocol.
In order to recover α, Bob uses a process known as belief propagation to refine his
initial probabilities for the entries of α based on β and the QBER. Note that in the
following discussion, Bob has full knowledge of his key vector, β, but his knowledge
of the Alice’s key vector, α is probabilistic. For example, suppose row i of H is a
parity check on three bits received by Bob, β1 = 1, β2 = 1, and β3 = 0, where the
expected QBER is 10% (chosen to prevent very small numbers in this example). The
probability that a key bit αj is zero or one based on the received values and the
QBER are denoted P0(j) and P1(j), respectively. For each of his bits βj , Bob assumes
that αj = 1 and computes rαj=1(i, j), which denotes the probability that the parity
check i is satisfied (pi = α1 + α2 + α3 (mod 2)) given this assumption. Alternatively,
rαj=1(i, j) may be viewed as the probability that αj = 1 given the value of pi and
what is known about the other bits of α involved in the ith parity check. For example,
rαj=1(i, 1) may be computed as follows:
rαj=1(i, 1) =
{
P0(2)P1(3) + P1(2)P0(3) for pi = 0
P0(2)P0(3) + P1(2)P1(3) for pi = 1.
(18)
As can be seen in table 2, the probability that the bits retain their received value
is high when pi = 0 since this is consistent with the received values of β. If instead
pi = 1, a high probability for bit flips is obtained since each row assumes that the
received values for the other bits are likely to be correct. This information is useful
when combined with the results of other parity checks.
After doing these computations for each row of H , Bob uses the information from
all the parity checks involving a particular key bit βj to compute new values of P
′
0(j)
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Table 2. Results for rαj=1(i, j).
j βj P0(j) P1(j) rαj=1(i, j) for pi = 0 rαj=1(i, j) for pi = 1
1 1 0.1 0.9 0.82 0.18
2 1 0.1 0.9 0.82 0.18
3 0 0.9 0.1 0.18 0.82
Table 3. Results for P ′
0
(j) and P ′
1
(j) values.
rαj=1(1, j) rαj=1(2, j) rαj=1(3, j) qαj=0(j) qαj=1(j) P
′
0(j) P
′
1(j)
0.82 0.82 0.82 0.0006 0.4963 0.0012 0.9988
0.18 0.82 0.82 0.0027 0.1089 0.0238 0.9762
0.18 0.18 0.82 0.0121 0.0239 0.3361 0.6639
0.18 0.18 0.18 0.0551 0.0052 0.9131 0.0869
and P ′1(j). If the j
th key bit is involved in three parity checks, Bob computes qαj=0(j)
and qαj=1(j), which represent the probability that αj is zero or one, respectively,
based on βj and the QBER, and that all parity checks involving αj are satisfied:
qαj=0(j) = P0(j)rαj=0(1, j)rαj=0(2, j)rαj=0(3, j) (19)
qαj=1(j) = P1(j)rαj=1(1, j)rαj=1(2, j)rαj=1(3, j) (20)
where rαj=0(i, j) = 1 − rαj=1(i, j). Since valid results must be consistent with all
parity checks, P ′0(j) and P
′
1(j) are obtained by normalizing qαj=0(j) and qαj=1(j).
For example, consider βj = 1, implying P0(j) = 0.1 and P1(j) = 0.9 as shown in
table 3. Even if one parity check suggests there is an error in this example, the
confidence that βj = 1 (i.e. βj was received correctly) still increases. With all three
parity checks suggesting a bit flip is necessary, a high confidence is obtained that
the received value of βj is incorrect. With two parity checks suggesting a bit flip is
required, the result does not significantly favour either result.
Bob can then select the most likely value for each bit to form β′, and compute p′ =
Hβ′ (mod 2). If p′ = p, the protocol is finished. Otherwise, additional iterations of
the protocol are performed. With the additional modification that Bob also computes
conditional probabilities, P ′0(i, j) and P
′
1(i, j), to use in (18) during subsequent
iterations, this procedure is generalized as the sum-product algorithm [39, 41].
8.2. Hardware LDPC Decoding
Interest in LDPC codes stems not only from their potential to perform near the
Shannon limit. Since the computations for each parity check and each key bit
are independent, the structure of the sum-product algorithm lends itself to parallel
computation. This makes sum-product decoding of LDPC codes well suited for high
speed implementation in custom hardware or in reconfigurable devices such as Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) [42]. However, floating-point computations are
expensive in terms of the amount of logic required. Thus, it is desirable to implement
LDPC decoding using fixed-point arithmetic (equivalent to integer arithmetic) with
as few bits as possible to represent the values. In initial simulations of fixed-point
decoding, we found that the primary obstacle for a small bit length was the very small
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Figure 14. Simulation results of the 1200× 4000 LDPC code using 16-bit fixed-
point (– – –,), 24-bit fixed-point (— · —,*), and floating-point (· · · · · ·,◦ ). The
inset shows the region where the performance begins to drop in more detail.
values obtained for the probabilities. This problem manifested as “divide by zero”
errors during the normalization since both q0(j) and q1(j) had rounded to zero. We
overcome this limitation by modifying the algorithm to set any occurrences of zero in
the q(j) values to the smallest possible non-zero value.
A LDPC code was designed with a 1200 × 4000 parity check matrix using
parameters similar to [39] (QBER=3%, parity checks on 20 key bits. Note that this
QBER also reflects our experimental results, see section 5). It has been shown that
having the key bits take part in a variable number of parity checks results in better
performance [43]. Thus, H has a fixed number of ones in each row, known as the
row weight, and a variable number of ones in each column, known as the column
weight. The method presented in [43] was used to determine the column weights by
applying a well known optimization technique with the constraints ensuring that the
design criteria (QBER and code rate) are met. In place of the arbitrary cost function
in [43], we use a function reflecting the computational complexity. Our code was
simulated over 40 iterations, with the number being selected based on tests which
showed very little improvement beyond this point. The results in figure 14 show that
24-bit fixed-point and floating-point have very similar decoding performance.
Using VHDL (a hardware description language) code generated in Matlab, we are
able to create code for parallel implementations of sum-product decoding for arbitrary
values of H . While a RTL (Register Transfer Level) simulation of the 1200 × 4000
LDPC code is possible, a fully parallel implementation is not possible at this time. A
60 × 200 LDPC code with a row weight of 12 that is capable of operating at 50MHz
was synthesized using the Artisan 3.0 logic cell library for 0.18 µm CMOS technology
(several generations behind state of the art). This code uses 12-bit arithmetic and
requires 46 clock cycles (0.92 µs) per iteration of the algorithm. Simulation results for
the performance of this code with a maximum of 40 iterations are given in table 4.
The design contains 1860429 cells with a total cell area of approximately 47.24 mm2.
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Table 4. Simulation results for 60× 200 LDPC decoding.
QBER (%) Success rate (%) Mean iterations Sifted key rate (Mb/s)
2.5 99.00 4.1070 52.9319
3.0 91.65 8.6785 25.0494
3.5 69.80 17.9455 12.1146
Attempts to synthesize a larger LDPC code using the current VHDL code have failed as
the synthesis tool does not have sufficient memory to complete the process. The size of
the design also suggests that a 1200×4000 code would be impractical to implement (as
a comparison, a processor is typically on the order of 100 mm2, including interconnect).
However, larger codes are preferred because they experience less variance from the
mean QBER and perform better relative to the Shannon limit.
It is important to note that we obtained these results without using any advanced
techniques to reduce the size of the design. More efficient multiplier designs or the
use of alternative number systems such as the multidimensional logarithmic number
system (MDLNS) [44] have the potential reduce the hardware required to perform
the computations. Larger block sizes could also be achieved using the partially
parallel implementations proposed in [45], where efficient schedules are used rather
than updating all probabilities at once, reducing the number of computations done in
parallel while mitigating the cost in terms of the run time.
9. Conclusion and Outlook
We have proposed a novel, fibre-based QKD system employing polarization encoding
and quantum frames, and have demonstrated in a long-term (37 hours) QKD proof-of-
principle study that polarization information encoded in the classical control frames
can indeed be used to stabilize unwanted qubit transformation in the quantum
channel. All optical elements in our setup can be operated at Gbps rates, which
is a first requirement for a future system delivering secret keys at Mbps. In order to
remove another bottleneck towards a high rate system, we are investigating forward
error correction based on Low-Density Parity-Check Codes [40, 41]. Work on the
implementation of a system that distributes a quantum key, building on the here
presented proof-of-concept demonstration, is under way.
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